TQM-ING OMB: OR WHY REGULATORY
REVIEW UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
12,291 WORKS POORLY AND WHAT
PRESIDENT CLINTON SHOULD DO
ABOUT IT
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I
INTRODUCTION

No feature of modem U.S. government has been more controversial over the
last decade than review of agency rules by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and other
parts of the Executive Office of the President.' And yet, despite all the
controversy, no president, not Bill Clinton2 and probably not even Ross Perot,
would dream of abolishing review of agency actions by the OMB, or some other
entity in the Executive branch. Indeed, on October 4, 1993, after this article was
presented, President Clinton signed an Executive Order revising the OMB
regulatory planning and review process,3 and incorporating some of the
suggestions made in this article.4 Clark Clifford explains: "If a President did
Copyright © 1994 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Formerly, Assistant Administrator and General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency,
1989-91. Senior partner and head of Washington Environmental Department, Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver and Jacobson, New York and Washington, D.C.; Julien and Virginia Cornell Professor of
Environmental Law and Litigation, Yale Law School (on leave of absence, 1993-94).
1. During the Bush Administration, the OMB served as a clearinghouse, collecting comments from
other agencies, members of the White House staff, and other entities within the Executive Branch, and
transmitting them to the EPA. In the balance of this article, references to the OMB also refer to
comments originating elsewhere in the Executive Branch and passed through the OMB.
2. Bill Clinton and Administrative Law, 18 ADMIN. L. NEWS 1 (1992) ("[The Clinton administration would retain those features of [Executive Order 12,2911 that further rational and coordinated
decisionmaking, but.., would modify them to make the process open and to give appropriate weight
to environmental, health, and safety issues, as well as economic issues.").
3. Exec. Order 12,866 ("Regulatory Planning and Review"), 58 FED. REG. 51735 (1993).
4. For example, the new Clinton Executive Order emphasizes identifying potential conflicts "at
an early stage" and convening annual "policy meetings" with agency heads to "seek a common
understanding of priorities." Id. at 51738, § 4. Compare infra text accompanying notes 28-38 (on
importance of developing a shared sense of mission between the OMB and the agencies). The principal
drafter of the new Clinton Executive Order, Sally Katzen, Administrator of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, reviewed a draft version of this article while the new executive order was being
drafted. See also Al Gore, Improving Regulatory Systems: Accompanying Report of the National
Performance Review 13 n.23 (Washington, D.C., September 1993) (citing the present article with
approval). In addition, the author served on the task force that prepared the Carnegie Commission
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not control the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy would control him."5 0MB review
is like God: if it did not exist, we would need to invent it.
Between 1989 and 1991, I found myself, as General Counsel of the
Environmental Protection Agency, on the front lines in perhaps the most
contentious and troubled relationship between the OMB and the agencies. This

article contains my reflections on what I saw and my thoughts on how the new
Administration should improve this necessary, but deeply troubled, relationship.
II
WHAT THE REGULATORY REVIEW CONTROVERSY OBSCURES

Most of the criticism of OMB review of EPA rules has fallen into two
categories: (1) that the OMB constitutes a secretive back-channel by which
groups with special access to the White House can express their views off the
public record,6 and (2) that the emphasis on economics and cost/benefit analysis
in Executive Order 12,291 is inconsistent with mandates in the environmental
statutes.7 Both of these criticisms raise important issues, and, for that reason,
I wish to make my position on them clear.
As does the Administrative Conference, I believe that communications by
interested parties (such as industry) to the OMB and the White House staff that

provide significant factual information should be documented and placed in the
public record.8 In addition, if important policy issues are raised by the OMB or
other agencies during Executive Office review, either orally or in writing, as a
prudential matter the nature and substance of the concerns raised should be
made available to the public at an appropriate time, probably after deliberations

report suggesting revisions to the OMB review process, Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology
and Government, Risk and the Environment: Improving Regulatory Decisionmaking 48-52, 112
(Washington, D.C., June 1993). The Carnegie Commission report was also considered by the
Administration in developing Exec. Order 12,866.
5.

CLARK CLIFFORD & RICHARD HOLBROOKE, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A MEMOIR 325

(1991). See also Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the PoliticalProcess, 84 YALE L.J.
1395 (1975) (central coordinating mechanism needed to harmonize policymaking by "single mission
agencies").
6. See, e.g. Erik 0. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision
of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURCES L. 1, 40-73 (1984); Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight
of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 151 (Autumn 1991)
("Congressional oversight hearings lent credence to charges that the OMB had served as a vehicle for
secret, back door lobbying by industry during the Reagan Administration."); Id. at 165-72 (secrecy in
the rulemaking process). See also Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte
Contacts By the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980).
7. Percival, supra note 6, at 168 ("Decisions reached at the behest of Executive Office reviewers
are likely to be more vulnerable to judicial challenge than are other regulations because regulatory
review usually emphasizes different factors than do the statutes and the administrative record."). See
also THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN
THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 1-16 (1991) (describing "clash of rulemaking cultures" between the OMB
and agencies).
8. Intragovernmental Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings (Recommendation
No. 80-6), 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-6 (1993).
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within the Executive Branch are completed.9 Excessive secrecy undermines
public confidence in the policy process and is not truly necessary to assure full
and frank discussion of options.
On the other hand, in my experience, economic analysis by the OMB
generally improves, as well as delays, the EPA rules."0 Indeed, many (perhaps
as much as eighty percent) of the major issues raised by the OMB had not
previously received substantial consideration in internal EPA deliberations. On
one hand, this is encouraging, in that it suggests that the OMB process is adding
value. On the other hand, it is also deeply disturbing, because fundamental
issues are raised very late in the process, when it is virtually impossible to do
anything productive about them.
While the OMB frequently raises fundamental questions about how to
improve the agency's proposed approach to regulation, the OMB does not
override statutory mandates. The "constitution" of OMB review, Executive
Order 12291,11 specifically provides that the OMB may not disregard statutory
requirements12 and may only review exercises of discretion by agencies. In my
experience, when agencies persuade the OMB and the White House that
provisions of their rules are truly required by statute, they have no difficulty
passing OMB review, even if the rules clearly would not pass muster under the
cost/benefit analysis of Executive Order 12,291.
Whether one thinks that the OMB process "frustrates statutory intent"
depends upon how commodious a view one adopts of the Executive Branch's
authority to interpret statutes in the wake of the Chevron decision,13 and even
more upon one's view of the extent to which legislative history (particularly floor
statements and committee reports of a single house) are regarded as binding. 4
Much of the rhetoric about the OMB frustrating the intent of statutes is really
an objection to recent Supreme Court decisions that have transferred power to
construe ambiguous statutes from the lower courts and congressional staff to the
Executive Branch.

9. But see Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking (Recommendation No. 88-9), 1 C.F.R. §
305.88-9 (1993) (distinguishing between oral and written policy guidance); Wolfe v. Department of
Health & Human Serv., 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding that records showing status of
rules pending at the OMB are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act).
10. See generally Stephen Breyer, Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Executive, 68 WASH. U. L. Q.
495 (1990) (panel discussion among Judge Stephen Breyer, Professor E. Donald Elliott, Judge Laurence
Silberman, and former Justice Department official Terry Eastland, at Federalist Society Conference,
"The President and Congress: Constitutionally Separated and Shared Powers," Washington, D.C., Jan.
19-20, 1990).
11. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
12. Id. § 2 ("to the extent permitted by law"). See also Larry L. Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Off. Legal Counsel, Memorandum Re: Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Federal
Regulation," February 13, 1981, reprinted in REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT APR. 1, 1990-MAR. 31, 1991, at 608, 612 (1990) (Attachment A to App. III).
13. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (holding that floor statements should be
considered but are not controlling).
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While these two issues-public oversight and the rise of regulatory analysis
drawn from economics-are important, they have monopolized public debate
about the OMB process to the exclusion of other important issues. It is these
unexplored management issues that I address in the balance of this article. The
essence of my complaint is not that the OMB is too powerful, but that because
the regulatory review process is poorly designed, review does not effectively
achieve its stated goals.
Although the entity that conducts regulatory review is part of the Office of
Management and Budget, the review process itself violates virtually every tenet
of good management-probably because it was designed by lawyers. 15 The
point is not a personal one, and in fact not all the designers of Executive Order
12,291 were lawyers. The point is rather that the basic modalities of review
under Executive Order 12,291 were drawn, perhaps unconsciously, from appellate
court review of agency rules. 6 Episodic judicial review of agency decisions has
not proved to be the most effective way of reshaping government policy. As a
management style, when the OMB borrows these techniques, it suffers from
many of the same deficiencies. In fairness, however, the OMB regulatory review
process probably has proved superior to the courts in articulating clear principles
of decision such as cost\benefit analysis. Chris DeMuth, one of the principal
drafters of Executive Order 12,291 and the first Head of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"), recently stated that these
principles were "the most important part" of Executive Order 12,291."7
This article looks at the regulatory review process from a management
perspective and suggests improvements. As the title of this symposium suggests,
one can view the regulatory review process as a regulatory system on a meta
level, "regulating the regulators." As a meta-regulator, the present system
violates virtually all that we know about how to design effective regulatory
systems. To be effective, a system of regulation must create compliance
incentives for regulated parties, rather than rely on corrective action and
oversight.
Part III of this article illustrates some of the recurrent problems of the
present design of the regulatory review system with a hypothetical case drawn

15. For a general discussion of the OMB review process by two of its designers, see Christopher
C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075
(1986).
16. Christopher C. DeMuth, Regulatory Policy in the Reagan Administration, in AMERICAN
ECONOMICS POLICY IN THE 1980's, 504, 505 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1993) (drawing analogy to "common
law of review of individual rules").
17. Personal communication, American Enterprise Political Economy Roundtable, Feb. 17, 1994.
Elsewhere, the present author has expressed some concern with the tendency of the new Clinton
Executive Order to obscure these clear principles by making many values equally paramount. See E.
Donald Elliott & Alan B. Horowitz, Risk-Based Environmental Priorities: What Priority?, in WATER
WHERE IS THE ENVIRONMENTAL PENDULUM Now?, Conference
RESOURCES REGULATION:
Proceedings (1993) (criticizing Exec. Order 12,866 on grounds that "[ijf every thing is a priority, then
nothing is a priority").
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from my experiences as the EPA General Counsel." Part IV uses some of the
principles of Total Quality Management ("TQM"), a management philosophy
developed by Dr. W. Edwards Deming, to criticize the OMB regulatory review
process. The final section of this article offers practical suggestions for
implementing some of the principles of TQM and redesigning the way that
regulatory review operates.
Of course, no application of TQM or any other management principles to redesign the regulatory review process is a panacea that would sweep away all
conflict between the OMB and the agencies whose rules it regulates and reviews.
On the contrary, as others have shown, and my own experience confirms, many
of the conflicts between the OMB and the EPA involve basic issues of public
policy, and derive ultimately from fundamental differences in the weight to be
accorded to competing values.19 Some policymakers value economic efficiency
more than others, whose primary concern is reducing risk to human health and
the environment. To some degree, then, conflict along the OMB-EPA fault-line
is healthy and, in any event, inevitable. It is not, however, irreducible; thus it is
the goal of this article to focus attention on the unnecessary inefficiencies in the
OMB review process, not the inevitable frictions and delays.
To a surprising degree, the current guerilla warfare between the OMB and
the EPA over the content of rules is neither necessary nor an inevitable
outgrowth of core differences in values. The unnecessary conflict and
inefficiency result in part from a defective process in which the actors do not
understand each other's goals and objectives, do not share a common definition
of the enterprise, and have become locked into fixed positions from which retreat
or compromise is difficult. In many instances, mutually destructive delays and
confrontations in the Bush Administration could have been avoided if the
process had been designed to facilitate a more collaborative, less confrontational
decisionmaking process.
III
THE IMAGINARY OMB REVIEW OF THE

EPA's PHLOGISTON RULE 20

Roughly eighteen months before sending the draft Phlogiston rule to the
OMB, the EPA submitted a regulatory agenda to the OMB under Executive
Order 12,498, identified Phlogiston as a substance that it intended to regulate,
and estimated the cost at $100 million per year. The EPA's submission

18. For examples of other scholars who have adapted the roman d clef technique to discuss their
experiences in government, see Douglas M. Costle, Brave New Chemical: The Future RegulatoryHistory
of Phlogiston,33 ADMIN. L. REV. 195 (1981); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376
(1982).
19.
20.

See MCGARrrY, supra note 7, at 5-16.
The hypothetical does not represent a single, actual case, but is instead a composite of my

experiences in government, every feature of it having occurred during my tenure at the EPA. Many of
the more troubling features of the process illustrated by the hypothetical are also well documented in
other published case studies. See, e.g., JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW

OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1976).
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contained the standard boilerplate language that its consideration of Phlogiston
had not yet progressed to the point at which it could identify particular options
or consider alternatives, and noted a statutorily mandated due date for the final
rule. At the time of this submission to the OMB, the EPA staff was already
actively considering three control options-flaring technology, process
modifications, and catalytic technology-and gathering data about the efficacy
and cost of each. The EPA justified its failure to share this information with the
OMB on the grounds that the options had not yet been approved by EPA
management, and hence did not represent a formal agency decision, but rather
the staff's decision of areas in which to gather information.
The OMB spent virtually no time reviewing the preliminary EPA submission,
noting only that the significant $100 million cost estimate for Phlogiston would
justify some attention later. In particular, the OMB did not delve beyond the
EPA's bland assurance that no options had been identified, did not focus on the
statutory requirements, and did not suggest creative approaches for the agency
to consider.
A few weeks later, EPA Deputy Administrator and the General Counsel and
Assistant Administrator for its Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation met
informally with the Acting Head of OIRA and the Branch Chief for the Natural
Resources Section of the OMB (who is in charge of review of all EPA rules).
At this meeting, the OMB representatives mentioned the upcoming Phlogiston
rule and expressed concern about its cost. The EPA's Deputy Administrator
noted their concern and assured them that he would review the matter in a week
or two, when he received a preliminary briefing on the status of the Phlogiston
rule.
The next stage in the process was "options selection," a briefing for the
Deputy Administrator by the workgroup at which they identified the options
under consideration and received preliminary guidance from the Agency's
management. No OMB representatives were present. After a thorough briefing
of the three technologies being considered-flaring technology, process
modifications, and catalytic technology-the Deputy Administrator stated that
he was concerned about the potential costs of the rule, and requested that the
staff consider innovative options, including incentive-based approaches along the
lines of those being undertaken by other programs. The OMB was not
mentioned.
At the next meeting of the workgroup, the staff lawyer from the General
Counsel's Office informed the other members that an incentive-based approach
would be illegal under the statute that applied to Phlogiston. The work group
nevertheless decided to include a study of an incentive-based approach, as
requested by the Deputy Administrator.
After several months, the workgroup briefed the Assistant Administrator for
the program within the EPA with regulatory authority over Phlogiston (the "lead
office"). She accepted the staff's recommendation to propose a technology-based
standard based on catalytic technology. This option was characterized as the
most cost-effective way to prevent pollution because of the resources that could
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be recovered, even though its direct costs were higher than flaring. Again, no
OMB representatives were present, and at the time the political appointee
responsible for the office regulating Phlogiston made her decision, she did not
have the benefit of any input from the OMB.
Next, the draft of the proposed rule and supporting material were circulated
for "red border" review to the other EPA offices for concurrence and comment.
Based on those comments, changes were made and the lead office Assistant
Administrator presented the matter for decision to the Deputy Administrator
(who was delegated authority to make the agency decision on this rule from the
Administrator). Again, the OMB did not receive copies of any of these
materials. Thus, when the Deputy Administrator made a decision on behalf of
the agency, he had no input from the OMB, other than their initial, informal
expression of concern. There had been no contact between the EPA staff
responsible for drafting the rule and the OMB staff responsible for reviewing it.
As expected, the Deputy Administrator followed the recommendation of the
lead office Assistant Administrator, and opted for the middle option of the three
presented to him, choosing neither the most nor the least expensive. 21 He then
forwarded his decision, with supporting materials, including the Regulatory
Impact Analysis ("RIA"), 2 to the OMB for review under Executive Order
12,291 as the EPA's proposed rule. Thus, when the OMB staff first received the
details about the Phlogiston rule, the EPA was already fully committed. That
is, the EPA staff and all of the EPA political appointees had made a decision
publicly, and the OMB analysis required by Executive Order 12,291 took place
after the decision by the EPA.
The OMB was not pleased. The RIA, which none of the EPA political
appointees had even seen, showed costs of approximately $300 million per
statistical life saved, well above the average for recent EPA rules (another fact
that the political appointees at the EPA did not know). In addition, the OMB
reviewer assigned to do most of the work (typically, a recent business or other
professional school graduate) believed that the federal government had no
business regulating Phlogiston at all and that the area should be left to the state
and private industry. He had never been briefed on the statutory mandate under
which the EPA was required to regulate Phlogiston.
The initial meeting between the OMB staff and the EPA representatives on
the proposed rule made little progress. The OMB expressed its typical
concern-that the rule was too expensive. The EPA responded in its typical
way-that the statute required it to do what it was doing.
After several unproductive meetings, which became quite heated on a
personal level, the issues were "elevated" to the political level. Meanwhile, the

21.

For a discussion of the professional ethos and incentives that affect senior federal managers, see

ROBERT A. KATZMAN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY (1980).

22. The RIA is the written analysis that agencies must compile as the basis for review of their major
rules. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988); Exec. Order
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
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Acting Director of OIRA received a letter from the Chair of the House
oversight subcommittee which demanded an explanation for the delay of the
Phlogiston rule, and threatened hearings. The OMB suspected that the EPA had
inspired the congressional inquiry.
Next, the Head of OIRA, the OIRA branch chief, and the OIRA reviewer
assigned to the case met with the EPA Deputy Administrator and the lead office
Assistant Administrator. The professional EPA staff was not represented, which
led them to suspect that the results of the meeting had been the result of wholly
political considerations. After the OMB outlined a few minor issues on which
progress had been made, the OMB representatives stated that the rule was too
expensive, and that the OMB would not approve it in its present form. The
OMB also expressed concern that the rule was not consistent with the
Administration's federalism policy (an issue that had not been vetted at the
EPA), and asked whether regulating Phlogiston could be left to the states. The
OMB also proposed the possibility of a trading system, in which Phlogiston
credits could be marketed and sold.
The Deputy Administrator assured the OMB that he was personally
sympathetic to these concerns and had been working to implement them at the
EPA. He noted, however, that it was too late to begin a fundamental rethinking of the Phlogiston rule along these lines, since none of the necessary data
had been gathered and since a statutory deadline loomed. He also expressed
concern that Congress and environmentalists would portray further EPA delay
as a sign that the Administration was not seriously committed to its professed
position of cleaning up the environment. He also pointed out that the proposed
federal Phlogiston rule was less expensive for industry than some of the more
extreme state regulations.
After several similar meetings, increasing public and congressional pressure
forced a compromise: the EPA would modify its technology-based approach to
exempt several categories of low volume-high cost sources (thereby bringing
down the costs) and would propose for comment in the Federal Register as an
option the OMB's suggestion that the whole area be left to regulation by the
states.23

23. The EPA General Counsel's office was firmly of the view that this approach was not legal under
the statute. A closely related approach, "challenge regulation," in which the EPA sets standards for
permissible state regulation, probably would be legal. This alternative was never mentioned to the OMB.
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IV
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

4

A. The Flaw Is In the System
Training in TQM often begins with the Parable of the Red Beads.' Teams
of six workers are formed and given the task of removing and separating red and
white beads from a large tank. Red beads represent defects, while the white
beads represent products that the customer wants. Teams usually consist of
three workers, a foreman, an inspector, and a top manager.
"Management" gives the "workers" a paddle with a series of indentations and
instructs them to use it to remove the white beads, while leaving the red beads
behind. The inspectors then remove by hand any extra red beads that have been
lifted out of the tank. With Dr. Deming keeping careful count of the results, the
experiment begins.
Some "workers" do better than others at removing white beads with the
paddles, but nobody is particularly successful. Lots of red beads come up with
each scoop of the paddle and have to be removed by the "inspectors." Nothing
that the "managers" try improves the "workers"' performance much: not
competing with other teams; not dictating precise operating procedures; not
setting quotas for how many white beads will be produced by each scoop of the
paddle; not paying incentive compensation to those workers who produce more
white beads than average; not firing those whose performance is sub-par; not
studying the techniques used by those who are best; not exhorting the "workers;"

24. Although a U.S. citizen, Dr. Deming's ideas were originally adopted by the Japanese, who credit
him for much of their recent economic success. More recently, U.S. companies have begun adopting
TQM with many extraordinary results. See, e.g., Doing It For Mother Earth, Bus. WK., Oct. 25, 1991,
at 44 (describing efforts by companies such as Xerox, Proctor & Gamble, Allied-Signal, and IBM to use
TQM to "cut pollution and improve compliance, often while lowering their environmental costs");
QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT. A FRAMEWORK FOR POLLUTION

PREVENTION (1993).

While Dr. Deming's ideas provide a convenient beginning for analyzing problems in the current
regulatory review process, one need not fully adopt the principles of TOM to understand the
organizational problems with the process. To some extent, TQM consists of common sense applied to
the design of systems and organizations. The key move for understanding what is wrong with the present
OMB regulatory review process consists of thinking about OMB review as a management or regulatory
system, and re-designing that system to be more effective than case-by-case, after-the-fact review.
Numerous books, articles, lectures, and even a PBS television program are now available about Dr.
Deming's "Total Quality Management" philosophy. For convenience, I have used two readily available
sources for citations, RAPHAEL AGUAYO, DR. DEMING: THE AMERICAN WHO TAUGHT THE JAPANESE

ABOUT QUALITY (1990) and MARY WALTON, THE DEMING MANAGEMENT METHOD (1986). An
excellent summary of Deming's life and an introduction of his ideas can also be found in his recent
obituary. John Holusha, W. Edwards Deming, Expert on Business Management,Dies at 93, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1993, at B7, cols. 1-4.
I want to pay special thanks to F. Henry Habicht, Deputy Administrator of the EPA, 1989-92, who
first introduced me to Dr. Deming's ideas.
25. AGUAYO, supra note 24, at 53-64; WALTON, supra note 24, at 40-51.
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not threatening the "workers;" and not adding more resources. None of these
conventional management strategies improves the average worker's performance.
Finally, frustrated at their inability to improve the results, the group is
encouraged to step back to reflect on the problem. At that point, Dr. Deming
observes that while there is a great deal of statistical variability among workers,
the paddles show remarkable consistency in their average efficiency in removing
white beads. Prodded by this hint, the group begins to realize that the red beads
and the white beads are of slightly different sizes, because the red beads have
been made by dipping white beads into paint. If a paddle is made carefully, with
holes just large enough to accommodate the white beads, it will easily scoop out
many more white beads, while leaving almost all of the red beads behind.
The Parable of the Red Beads is designed to make several points, the most
important of which for our purposes is that "[wiorkers work within a system
that-try as they might-is beyond their control. It is the system, not their
individual skills, that determines how they perform."26
Unenlightened managers frequently blame individual "bad" workers for
problems in the system that are beyond the control of the workers; real progress
is possible only by improving the system. It is ultimately the responsibility of
managers to improve the design of the system-or perhaps better said, to create
the conditions in which those who understand the system better than the
managers are motivated and empowered to improve the system continuously.
Similarly, in most administrations, after a few years, the OMB and White
House "managers" generally come to hold in contempt their erstwhile colleagues
in the agencies, believing that they have "gone native" and adopted the
characteristic values of their agencies. Like the managers in the Parable of the
Red Beads, political managers in the White House and the OMB tend to blame
the individual "workers" (that is, political appointees) in the agencies, rather
than transforming the system so that they can produce more effectively.
Statistics similar to Dr. Deming's can be compiled to test the cost-effectiveness of the present OMB review process under Executive Order 12,291. An
analysis by economist Kip Viscusi shows that the OMB is remarkably unsuccessful at holding down the costs of EPA rules. The OMB blocked only those
proposed rules whose cost exceeded $142 million per statistical life saved.2 7
While the OMB is sometimes marginally successful in making rules less
expensive than they otherwise would have been, the hypothetical case of
Phlogiston discussed above reveals that the OMB review process rarely succeeds
in stimulating the EPA or other agencies to rethink their regulations in any
fundamental way.

26.
27.

WALTON, supra note 24, at 51.

W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 265

(1992) (I[T]he minimum tradeoff threshold for the OMB to reject a regulation is quite high. None of
the [30 EPA-OSHA-CPSC-FAA rules studied 1980-1989] with costs per life saved below $142 million

were rejected. The OMB's efficacy is apparently limited to the more extreme instance of regulatory
excess.").
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While observers may differ over whether $142 million per statistical life saved
is a desirable, cost-effective level of risk reduction,' Viscusi's statistics do give
some indication of the approximate average level of performance to be expected
over time from the current system of the OMB's case-by-case review of rules
under Executive Order 12,291. As in the Parable of the Red Beads, substantial
improvement in the process will come neither from blaming the workers nor
from motivating them to work harder; there must be changes in the system
before the process will improve.
B. The Fallacy of Quality by Inspection
A second, fundamental principal of TQM is that quality cannot be "inspected
into" a product:
"Inspection with the aim of finding the bad ones and throwing them out is too
late, ineffective, costly," says Dr. Deming. "In the first place, you can't find the
bad ones, not all of them. Second, it costs too much." The result of such
inspection is scrap, down-grading and rework, which are expensive, ineffective

and do not improve the process. "Quality comes not from inspection but from
improvement of the process."
"The old way: Inspect bad quality out."
"The new way: Build good quality in."'

The basic philosophy underlying the concept of case-by-case regulatory
review is improving quality through inspections at the end of the production line.
In the governmental context, the costs of relying on an inspection strategy as the
primary means to achieve quality may be different than in commerce, but they
are nonetheless real. A great deal of the delay and frustration inherent in the
current OMB process is attributable to the costs of unnecessary "rework."
Rework is an inevitable cost of using a system that detects problems through
inspection late in the process, rather than redesigning the system to do it right
the first time.
When the OMB raises fundamental issues about a rule in the final days
before promulgation, after two years of agency work, agency staffers understandably scream "foul" and complain of "late hits." Moreover, from the EPA's
perspective, creative options are often unavailable when issues are raised late,
because, at such a late date, it is impossible to perform the necessary staff work
and develop the record to support a change in approach (not to mention to
comply with public notice-and-comment requirements).
The truth of the matter is that the "inspector," the OMB, has never given the
"workers" in the agencies the basic tools needed to do it right the first time.
While technical guidance abounds about the required contents of the technical

28.
29.

See infra text accompanying notes 37-38 for a discussion of shared and conflicting agency goals.
WALTON, supra note 24, at 60. See also AGUAYO, supra note 24, at 139-48.
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economic analysis, the RIA, the OMB has never clearly articulated its standard
of review to the political managers at the agencies.'
Agency managers are left
to deduce from case-by-case experience what the OMB requires before it will
sign off on a rule. Correcting a worker's errors one-by-one is an extremely
inefficient and frustrating training strategy.
To his credit, Arthur Fraas, chief of the Natural Resources Branch of OIRA,
at OMB, the chief reviewer of EPA rules, recognizes that improved methods of
helping the agencies get it right the first time are needed. In a 1991 article, Fraas
mentions hopefully several new OMB guidelines dictating improvements in the
content of RIAs, but he concludes:
The new OMB guidelines and the OMB efforts under Executive Order 12291
will not be sufficient, however, to improve federal agency analysis of proposed
regulatory actions. These measures will need to be supplemented by institutional
changes within the agencies so that decisionmakers are provided with the analysis
required to make effective and efficient regulatory decisions. 1

To some degree, the promulgation of Executive Order 12,498 in 1985 was a
recognition of the inadequacy of case-by-case inspection alone to improve
regulatory quality. Executive Order 12,498 requires that each agency head
annually submit to the Director of the OMB a draft statement of its regulatory
goals and plans for the coming year. These plans are then reviewed and
assembled, along with an introductory message (nominally signed by the
president), as the annual Regulatory Program of the United States Government.
In theory, the annual process under Executive Order 12,498 for compiling
this document might have become a productive setting in which the OMB and
the agencies could reach a real consensus about their future goals and objectives.
In reality, however, the process results in both sides producing massive amounts
of paper, most of which is not read, or, if read, is not taken seriously.
At a recent panel discussion, the OMB's Deputy Director for Regulatory
Affairs, Frank Hodsell, admitted that the Executive Order 12,498 process had
not lived up to expectations.32
Although Hodsell attributed this failure
primarily to the OMB's inability to devote sufficient resources to reviewing the
agencies' draft plans, the reasons run far deeper. In the present adversarial
climate, agencies like the EPA see themselves as having no incentive or
motivation to be forthcoming in sharing information or developing plans
cooperatively with the OMB. When asked to identify the various options under
consideration as part of the regulatory planning process, they typically stonewall
by responding in generalities or by stating that it is still too early in regulatory
30. To some degree, the absence of clear guidance for political appointees during the Bush
Administration about what the OMB considered acceptable may have resulted from the Senate's refusal
to confirm President Bush's nominee to head OIRA in a dispute over procedures.
31. Arthur Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environmental Policy, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (Autumn 1991) (emphasis added).
32. Frank Hodsell, Panel Discussion Before the ABA Administrative Law Section, Washington,
D.C., October 2, 1992.
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development to identify specific options, even though the agency's work groups
may already be considering several well-defined options.
As long as agencies continue to see themselves as being locked in a
competitive power struggle with the OMB over the content of regulations, a
struggle in which one side ultimately "wins" and the other "loses,"3 3 all the
paper planning in the world will not lead to real improvements in the process.
Agencies will continue to hide the ball, and engage in other bureaucratic
stratagems, fearing that greater involvement by the OMB in the early stages of
regulatory development will only increase the OMB's power to work its will to
the agency's detriment.
C. Increasing Alignment With Suppliers And Defining Quality
The recent climate of mutual hostility and suspicion between agencies and
the OMB is similar to that which has traditionally prevailed between labor and
management in poorly-run enterprises. Workers, who are in the best position to
be aware of problems in the production process, are afraid to suggest improvements in productivity for fear that such suggestions will lead to layoffs.'
Before workers will be willing to aid in improving the system, they must
overcome their fears and see themselves as having a long-term stake in the
enterprise. To this end, management must foster a common sense of mission and
purpose.
One of Dr. Deming's most revolutionary ideas comes into play here. Rather
than switching suppliers to take advantage of short-term cost differentials, Dr.
Deming argues that enterprises should form stable relationships with suppliers,
based on loyalty and trust, making them long-term partners in improving the
common enterprise.35 "A buyer will serve his company best," he argues, not
by striking deals with the cheapest supplier in the short run, but "by developing
a long-term relationship of loyalty and trust with a single vendor" so that
customer and supplier can work "together to reduce costs and improve
quality."'6

Adapting this principle to the context of government is not a simple task.
The EPA does not distrust the OMB because it is afraid that the OMB will take
its business elsewhere. Rather, the EPA and the OMB are institutions that see
themselves as committed to different values, different missions, and different
conceptions of what constitutes good policy. As long as they see themselves as
being locked into a competitive struggle over the content of particular rules, they
will have no reason to cooperate.
One potential way to develop a more cooperative relationship between the
EPA and the OMB has already been tried: internalizing the OMB-review

33.
34.
35.
36.

See Percival, supra note 6, at 153.
WALTON, supra note 24, at 72-73.
AGUAYO, supra note 24, at 149-57.
WALTON, supra note 24, at 62.
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process by creating a devil's advocate within the agency. Throughout the
Reagan years, the EPA's policy office, the Office of Policy, Planning and
Evaluation ("OPPE"), served as a kind of "mini-OMB" within the agency.
OPPE shared many of the OMB's economic perspectives and values and raised
its concerns during internal agency policy deliberations before rules went to the
OMB for review.37 This was a useful development, as it gave agency managers
both a valuable advance look at the kinds of arguments that they would face at
the OMB and an opportunity to build creative responses into rules at the agency
level. Over time, however, OPPE came to be viewed as "the enemy within."
During the Bush Administration, OPPE analysts were on occasion actually
accused of talking to their counterparts at the OMB, a "charge" that they
vehemently denied. As OPPE took on new missions in the international arena
and in promoting cross-media integration, its role as an advocate for regulatory
creativity and efficiency on particular rules gradually atrophied.
While bringing the culture of regulatory review inside the agency's doors is
a useful first step, developing a relationship of trust and cooperation requires
more fundamental changes. Deming's idea of stable, cooperative relationships
between customers and suppliers depends not only upon mutual understanding
and exchange of information, but also upon developing a common vision and a
shared stake in the long-term goals of the enterprise. The EPA and the OMB
currently lack such shared goals.
In a commercial context, workers, suppliers, and management can develop
a shared sense of mission around the idea of improving quality-a common
purpose for the enterprise from which all can benefit. According to Deming,
quality can be defined as anything that enhances the product from the viewpoint
of the customer.' When quality is enhanced, all members of the enterprise can
share the benefits. Is there any analogous lodestar for quality in government?
The first problem in applying the quality paradigm to government is
determining who one's "customers" really are. Do officials of the Executive
Branch owe their ultimate allegiance to the president, to the Congress, to the
statutes they administer, to constituent groups, to the best interests of the citizens
of the United States, or to some abstract ideals of professionalism? These are
not easy issues, and they underlie a great deal of the tensions between the EPA
and the OMB, particularly during the Reagan and Bush Administrations, when
one party controlled the Congress and another the Presidency. Few career EPA
employees believe in their heart of hearts that the temporary occupant of either
the EPA Administrator's office or the White House is their ultimate "customer."
Nor do they believe that giving either one whatever she or he wants necessarily
translates into better quality. On the other side of the street (or, more precisely,
at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue), the OMB will never be more effective
at improving regulation until it recognizes the legitimacy of the statutory missions

37.

See McGARrrY, supra note 7, at 239-40.

38.

AGUAYO, supra note 24, at 35.
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that Congress has given the agencies, missions that agency employees take
seriously.
In Reinventing Rationality, an excellent book about the rise of OMB review,
Professor Thomas McGarity portrays the conflict between the OMB and the
EPA and other regulatory agencies as a seemingly irreconcilable clash of "two
regulatory cultures" with different goals and values.39 While these problems are
very real, there are two basic responses to them. First, the gulf between the
EPA's goals and the OMB's goals may not actually be so wide that it is
impossible to identify areas in which the two sides might agree on a vision of
good policy. Second, in the same way that incentives must be created that
encourage workers and suppliers to become partners in the overall enterprise,
so too must the EPA and other agencies be given a stake in making their rules
more efficient.
V
WHAT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION SHOULD

Do

A. Defining Shared Goals
The first step in developing a more cooperative relationship between the
OMB and the agencies would be to develop an agreed-upon statement of goals.
Conflicts between the goals of the EPA and the OMB can best be accommodated if they are brought out into the open and resolved through mutual discussion,
in order to identify areas of agreement and common interests. Few, if any, at the
EPA actually believe that wasting economic resources is a good thing; it is simply
a price that some are more willing than others to accept if necessary to achieve
their overarching goal of protecting public heath and the environment. Similarly,
I have never met an OMB analyst who was truly opposed to all government
action to eliminate risks to health and the environment, as long as she could be
convinced that the risk was real and substantial, and that the government's action
would produce net benefits in excess of costs. Hence, there is room for
substantial agreement in reaching a definition of quality in the context of
environmental regulation.
A presidential edict, whether in the form of an Executive Order or the
Annual Regulatory Message, is no substitute for a dialogue at the working level
to develop an agreed-upon statement of goals by which quality can be measured.
A fundamental premise of the Deming management philosophy is that simply
mandating a change in objectives from the top down will not work;' top
management must transform the system, but they can do so only by creating
conditions in which everyone becomes an active participant in improving quality.

39.

See generally MCGARrrY, supra note 7.
40. See AGUAYO, supra note 24, at 11-12 (criticizing "management by objectives"); Walton, supra
note 24, at 90-92 (emphasizing the dangers of using performance ratings).
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Amazingly enough, however, dialogue between agencies aimed at reaching
a statement of goals and objectives does not presently occur. The EPA recently
instituted an agency-wide strategic planning process, but the OMB has not been
brought into the process of developing the plans. Similarly, the Regulatory
Program of the United States Government41 is largely an OMB document; while
agencies may be given an opportunity to review nearly final drafts of limited
portions of the document, they are not brought into the process of developing
the statements of regulatory goals to nearly the same extent that they participate
in other major policy initiatives, such as the State of the Union Address or the
National Energy Strategy.
Nor are there more informal mechanisms for developing a consensus about
regulatory goals between agency managers and the OMB reviewers. For
example, in the Bush Administration, new political appointees were given a twoday orientation seminar at the White House, but no one from the OMB briefed
them on the goals of the regulatory review program, much less solicited their
input. Nor was there any training by experienced agency managers about past
successes and failures in making rules more efficient.
At the level of career staff, the lack of communication about goals and
objectives is even more profound. As a matter of practice, the EPA career staff
who develop rules are generally excluded from the OMB meetings at which their
work product is reviewed.
Obviously, increasing the opportunities for dialogue and communication
about shared goals should be a high priority for the Clinton Administration.
One frequently used way to structure and focus this dialogue is to draft a "vision
statement," setting forth a consensus view of the enterprise's goals. My office
at the EPA went through this exercise and found that it was a surprisingly
rewarding way to think through and clarify our purpose.
B. Giving Agency Officials a Stake in Regulatory Efficiency
While there is already some room for agreement on a shared definition of
quality between the OMB and agencies such as the EPA, much more can and
must be done to create a real community of interest around achieving regulatory
goals as efficiently as possible.
Today, the OMB's regulatory review effort relies exclusively on the "stick"
of disapproval. Rules that do not meet the OMB's (often vague and subjective)
minimum standards of efficiency are disapproved or delayed-unless, of course,
a statutory deadline or political pressure can be mounted to force the OMB to
sign off despite its objections. There are no incentives for agencies to devise
more creative ways to reduce costs while still achieving their regulatory
objectives. Just as a commercial enterprise must find ways to convince suppliers
and workers that they will share in the profits from improvements in quality
41. See supra text accompanying note 31 for a discussion of how the Regulatory Program of the
United States Government is produced.
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before they will become active partners in improving product quality, so too must
the OMB find ways to enlist agencies as partners in improving the quality of
rules, rather than punishing them when they fail to live up to the OMB's
standards.
There are several obvious ways to use incentives to promote greater
regulatory efficiency. Professional recognition is one. The Deming Prize,
established in 1951 in Japan for individuals and companies, is now awarded
annually in a nationally televised ceremony,42 and it is "the most prestigious
award a Japanese company or industrialist can win."'43 On the other hand, until
recently," no president or other high level U.S. government official had ever
given special public recognition to a government employee or agency for
improving the quality or efficiency of its regulatory output.
More fundamentally, agencies need to be convinced that it is in their interest
to improve the quality of their rules. If, as Professor McGarity and others posit,
agencies such as the EPA are primarily concerned with achieving their
programmatic goals, incentives should be structured so that they will achieve
more of their own goals by promulgating efficient rules. At present, the
incentive structure for agencies offers no reward for developing more efficient
rules (other than possibly overcoming OMB and industry opposition), and it may
have just the opposite effect. Innovative regulatory approaches may serve to
minimize burdens on the regulatory community, but they are often riskier and
more costly for agencies to develop. If the agency itself does not share
appreciably in the benefits of regulatory innovation, it will have little incentive
to pioneer new approaches, rather than adhering to tried and true, if inefficient,
methods of regulating.4"
One unobserved advantage of the proposed regulatory budget is that by
establishing a fixed ceiling on the costs of regulation over a given time period,
it would give agencies a tangible incentive to make their rules more efficient.
Increased efficiency would allow them to address more of the risks to health and
the environment within their fixed budgets. Less radical incentives might include
using the standard budgetary process to reward agencies for particularly
successful regulatory initiatives.'

supra note 24, at 15.
supra note 24, at 6.
44. Since 1989, the Federal Quality Institute has administered the Presidential Award for Quality
to recognize federal agencies that have implemented TQM in an exemplary manner. See Presidential
Award for Quality, 1993 Application, FQI-PA92, May 1992. In addition, some agancies now have
internal award programs. For instance, the EPA occasionally has honored employees with the F. Henry
Habicht Award for Outstanding Leadership in TQM.
42.
43.
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46. The conventional budgeting process is probably slightly perverse from the perspective of
promoting efficient rules, in that it tends to reward bureaucratic empire-builders for promulgating
inefficient rules that require more employees to operate.
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C. Training and Skills
In addition to motivating employees and suppliers to develop more efficient
rules, managers must equip them with the skills and tools to improve the quality
of their product.
Systematic training programs for agency staff about past successes, useful
techniques for making rules more efficient, and what to look for in the future
might be the single most cost-effective method of improving the efficiency of
agency rules. Despite a substantial agency budget for training, no spending is
specifically targeted toward teaching agency program staff the skills and
techniques of economic and policy analysis practiced by OMB and OPPE
analysts. As long as improving the efficiency of agency rules is regarded not as
part of everyone's job, but only as the special province of an adversarial group
of reviewers, there will be little, if any, progress in enhancing regulatory
efficiency.
Enhancing the efficiency of government regulation cannot be achieved by an
OMB inspection and review process tacked on at the "end of the pipe," just as
end of pipe pollution controls are often not as efficient as preventing pollution
in the production process. A commercial enterprise must transform its existing
culture to instill a quality ethic throughout the organization. Real change
requires transforming agency cultures to build quality into rules at every stage
of the process.47
VI
CONCLUSION

Many of the conflicts in which political actors engage are unnecessary,
because our present structure for identifying options is not well-suited to seeking
out mutually beneficial ("win/win") options. The relationship between the EPA
and the OMB is a good example of a "game" that could be re-engineered to
mutual benefit. Like rats in a maze, a husband and wife in a bad marriage, or
the prisoners in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the EPA and the OMB continue to play
out a struggle over options that neither of them would rationally choose if the
game were restructured to maximize mutual achievement of goals.
The profound knowledge of TQM is that the human systems in which we find
ourselves are not given and immutable; rather than merely play the game, we can
and must reflect on improving the system that creates our incentives.

47. To their credit, former-EPA Administrator William Reilly and Deputy Administrator F. Henry
Habicht instituted a broadly based program of TQM training for EPA employees. This article can be
understood as a plea to extend that program to the OMB and the Executive Branch more generally.

